WORK INCENTIVES OF MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES AND THE ROLE OF ASSET TESTING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pashchenko, Svetlana; Porapakkarm, Ponpoje
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12247
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1117-1154
• 关键词: health-insurance reform; Welfare participation; disability insurance; LABOR; PROGRAMS; WEALTH; IMPACT

摘要

Should asset testing be used in means-tested programs? Focusing on Medicaid, we show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: If Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity, this results in substantial welfare gains. We show that asset testing can achieve a similar outcome when asset limits are allowed to be different for workers and nonworkers.