RANDOM AUTHORITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Siguang; Weng, Xi
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Peking University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12214
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 211-235
• 关键词: spatial competition; 2-sided markets; MODEL; equilibrium; monopoly; QUALITY; GOODS; media

摘要

This article rationalizes matrix management in a multiproject organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Project managers are privately informed about local conditions and communicate strategically via cheap talk. Matrix management is modeled as a randomization over deterministic authority allocations. We show that random authority is strictly optimal when the conflict between adaptation and coordination is very severe or the coordination need is very small. Moreover, the optimal degree of delegation changes nonmonotonically in the coordination need when the incentives of the project managers are sufficiently aligned.