STRATEGIC ADVERTISING AND DIRECTED SEARCH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro; Julien, Benoit; Wang, Chengsi
• 署名单位: Deakin University; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Mannheim; Monash University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12235
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 783-806
• 关键词: capacity constraints; posted prices; equilibrium; MODEL; INFORMATION; auctions; QUALITY; sales

摘要

Imperfect observability and costly informative advertising are introduced into a standard directed search framework. Capacity-constrained sellers send costly advertisements to direct buyers' uncoordinated search by specifying their location and terms of trade. We show that the equilibrium advertising intensity is nonmonotonic in the buyer-seller ratio. In addition, we also find that price posting dominates auctions since both mechanisms yield the same expected revenue, but the latter results in higher advertising expense. Finally, we find a positive comovement between market transparency and price for low market tightness when the measure of informed buyers is endogenous.