INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xie, Jia
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12212
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 157-182
• 关键词: urban-growth boundaries; LAND

摘要

This article studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or dealt with by a contract on the outcome, so information systems are used for incentives only. When the outcome is noncontractible, a risk-averse principal relies on imperfect information for both incentives and risk sharing. Under the first-order approach, this article relaxes Gjesdal's criterion for ranking information systems and finds conditions justifying the first-order approach when the principal is risk averse and the outcome is noncontractible.