Stable mixing in Hawk-Dove Games under best experienced

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.003
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 148-161
• 关键词: Hawk-Dove Game; Chicken game; learning; evolutionary stability; Best experienced payoff dynamics

摘要

The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium, in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that when two populations of agents are randomly matched to play the hawk-dove game, then there is convergence to one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that plausible dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions based on the payoffs obtained in a few trials, often give rise to the opposite result: convergence to one of the interior stationary states.