Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morimoto, Shuhei
• 署名单位: Tokyo Metropolitan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.001
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 30-41
• 关键词: Matching; core; strategy-proofness; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness.In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result, we also obtain impossibility and characterization results in our environment.