Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karos, Dominik; Rachmilevitch, Shiran
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 112-117
• 关键词: Bargaining; Midpoint domination; Superadditivity

摘要

Five classical and uncontroversial axioms-symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted mono- tonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity-characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the -th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.