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作者：Malcomson, James M.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Employees are divided into grades. Toyota places suppliers into only a small number of This paper shows that grouping of privately informed and persistent agent types arises in relational incentive contracts when agent type is continuous. Malcomson (2016) showed full separation is not possible if, following full revelation of an agent's type, payoffs for and agent are on the Pareto frontier. This paper shows how much separation can be Specifically, it characterizes the finest partitioning that...
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作者：Akoz, Kemal Kivanc; Dogan, Emre; Kesten, Onur; Okulicz, Danisz
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Sydney; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stab...
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作者：Grigis, Federico; Lozza, Sergio Ortobelli; Vitali, Sebastiano
作者单位：University of Bergamo; University of Bergamo; Charles University Prague
摘要：We propose a model of information transmission and reputation building within a social network that exploits portfolio theory and option structures. The network aims to estimate an unknown parameter through multiple communication rounds. At every communication round, estimates of different agents' abilities are shared, avoiding the repetition of information. These estimates are interpreted as financial assets driven by a compound Poisson process. After every communication round, agents constru...
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作者：Hsu, Chin-Chia; Ajorlou, Amir; Jadbabaie, Ali
摘要：In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of sharing decisions among users of a Twitter-like social network. Agents have a subjective prior on an unobservable real-valued state, representing their beliefs on a topic that is subject to a binary action. Agents cast their binary action, matching the sign of the state. Before the action stage, a small fraction of agents receive a piece of news which impacts their beliefs. Those who receive the news update their belief and make a decision as...
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作者：Abe, Takaaki
作者单位：Kyushu University
摘要：We consider a committee that consists of n members with one person one vote approving a proposal if the number of affirmative votes from the members reaches threshold k. Which threshold k between 1 and n is stable for the committee? We suppose that if a new threshold k' proposed by some committee members obtains k or more affirmative votes, then the new threshold replaces the current one. Assuming that each member has preferences for the set of possible thresholds, we analyze which threshold m...
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作者：Goel, Sumit
摘要：We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more competitive contests, i.e., contests with greater inequality across prizes. In the contest framework, we investigate the effect of manipulating individual prizes and increasing competition on expected effort, identifying conditions on ability distributi...
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作者：Asulin, Yamit; Heller, Yuval; Munichor, Nira; Zultan, Ro'i
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Bar Ilan University
摘要：People behave more pro-socially when observed by others. We develop a theoretical model incorporating social distance between agent and observer and test its predictions in a field experiment with 670 high-school students. The experiment manipulated the observer's identity (friend, acquaintance, or none) and capped personal rewards. Observability increased effort, and personal rewards enhanced above-threshold effort when effort was observable. Among young adolescents, these effects were strong...
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作者：Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Reichman University
摘要：In the job market, managers typically use pre-employment tests to evaluate a candidate's value. Candidates often respond by claiming, in a non-verifiable way, that circumstances not related to their value impair their ability to perform well in the test and, thus, render the test an unreliable source of information. We term such cheap-talk claims excuses. We show that if the candidate's expected performance in the test sufficiently depends on skills orthogonal to the candidate's value, the can...
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作者：Dudek, Maciej
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We show that rational profit maximizing firms can find it optimal to wage discriminate against females even though females and males are identical in all respects. Specifically, we argue that a pay gap can emerge naturally as discrimination against females, in the first place, can endogenously affect the elasticity of labor supply and can make the supply of labor of males less elastic and the supply of labor of females more elastic. Furthermore, we note that once this endogenous change in elas...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper examines bargaining between a seller and a buyer with a binary private valuation. The seller offers a price to the buyer in each period. We explicitly construct the complete equilibrium set via an induction argument both for the finite and infinite horizon cases. When the horizon is finite and the probability of a high buyer valuation is large, the seller consistently charges a high price, resulting in trade bursts at the outset and deadline, with constant trade rates in between. We...
