Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Merzoni, Guido; Trombetta, Federico
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.001
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 132-143
• 关键词: Asymmetric mismatch; Pandering; Political agency; Special interest groups; populism

摘要

We study the implications of state-dependent costs of policy mismatch in political agency models where politicians have reputational concerns and good politicians share the same objectives as the voters. We find that state-dependent costs can increase the set of parameters where pandering is an equilibrium strategy. Indeed, in our model, pandering can arise even without office rents. Moreover, we show that voters do not necessarily prefer biased politicians to be in favour of the policy that produces the cheapest expected cost of mismatch. We discuss the implications of those results for populism, environmental policies and the equilibrium incentives to over- or under-provide lockdowns or other mitigation measures. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.