Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McMurray, Joseph
• 署名单位: Brigham Young University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.028
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 150-161
• 关键词: polarization; Pandering; information aggregation; Jury theorem; median voter; Common interest; COMPETITION; ELECTIONS; ideology; public opinion; voting; Epistemic democracy

摘要

Adding candidates to a one-dimensional common-interest voting model, this paper shows that catering to centrist voters can lower social welfare. The electoral benefit of doing so is weak, so candidates polarize substantially in equilibrium, resolving a long-standing empirical puzzle. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.