Stable sharing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nicolo, Antonio; Salmaso, Pietro; Sen, Arunava; Yadav, Sonal
• 署名单位: University of Padua; University of Manchester; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Umea University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.009
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 337-363
• 关键词: Job sharing; matching; STABILITY; Pareto efficiency

摘要

We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail. & COPY; 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).