Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu; Yamamori, Tetsuo
• 署名单位: Future University Hakodate; Chuo University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.009
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 955-977
• 关键词: Volunteer 's dilemma; Risk dominance; Quantal response equilibrium; The depth of reasoning; inequity aversion; Regret aversion; experiment

摘要

This study explores asymmetric volunteer dilemma games in which players incur different costs for volunteering. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that a player with less cost is more likely to contribute at the equilibrium if it is risk dominant. We have re-examined this hypothesis theoretically and experimentally and found that even when focusing on risk-dominant equilibria, the explanatory power of the theory is not universal. An econometric comparison among several behavioral models including regret aversion shows that quantal response equilibrium best explains the data.