Submission costs in risk-taking contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Whitmeyer, Mark
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 101-112
• 关键词: All -pay contests; Stochastic contests; Rank -order selection; optimal stopping; Submission costs; Bayesian persuasion

摘要

This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission cost is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission cost or the lowest submission cost is optimal.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.