Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Uyanik, Metin; Yengin, Duygu
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; University of Adelaide
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.011
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 548-580
• 关键词: Collective sales; En -bloc sales; Land assembly; Complementary goods; Holdout; Quota rule; Termination threshold; Majority termination; Strata scheme; Freeze -out merger; Multilateral bargaining; Circular bargaining; Simultaneous bargaining; efficient equilibrium

摘要

Complementarity is common in land-assembly problems, such as a developer buying the entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Holdout (delay or block of projects by sellers) is common in these problems under unanimity-rule. Motivated by the recent policy practices in strata-sales, we introduce a new bargaining model with quotarule. We show that under quota-rule, there is no holdout when there are two sellers or players are sufficiently patient. No-holdout equilibrium is unique, efficient and yields immediate sale of all goods as outcome. When quota rule is used, efficient equilibrium is still obtained under alternative bargaining protocols and with multiple sellers. We also show that the no-holdout result is not due to the specific bargaining protocol. & COPY; 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by-nc -nd /4 .0/).