Strategy-proof allocation with outside option

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.004
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 50-67
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; outside option; market design; random assignment

摘要

Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation model in which outside options are available to agents, we prove two results that demonstrate the interplay between strategy-proofness and outside options. The two results treat deterministic allocation mechanisms and random allocation mechanisms in a unified way. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down agents' probabilities of consuming outside options is equivalent to pinning down a mechanism. The second result presents a sufficient condition for two strategy-proof mechanisms to be welfare equivalent. We show the usefulness of the two results in several applications. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.