Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wright, Julian
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 91-102
• 关键词: Experiment; COOPERATION; Tit-for-tat; Grim trigger strategy

摘要

An experiment is designed to provide a snapshot of the strategies used by players in a repeated price competition game with a random continuation rule. One hundred pairs of subjects played the game over the Internet, with subjects having a few days to make their decisions in each round. Occasionally subjects are asked to enter one-period-ahead pricing strategies instead of prices. According to the elicited strategies, between 90% and 95% of subjects punish less harshly (in their initial response to a deviation) than implied by the grim trigger strategy, and do so in a way that depends on the size of the other subject's deviation. Future earnings are highest for subjects adopting the tit-for-tat strategy, even after controlling for a subject's past earnings. Punishment strategies are generally softer and more graduated than implied by a grim trigger strategy, and do better as a result. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.