Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• 署名单位: Open University Israel; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.003
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 100-121
• 关键词: Unawareness; awareness; common prior; agreement; speculative trade; interactive epistemology; Inattention

摘要

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-speculative-trade theorem according to which there cannot be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we prove a generalization of the No-agreeing-to-disagree theorem. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.