Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffya, John; Kim, Sun-Tak
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Taiwan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.008
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 111-131
• 关键词: Voting behavior; Voting mechanisms; Condorcet jury model; information aggregation; laboratory experiments

摘要

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed, then sincere voting in accordance with a voter's private information is always rational while participation may become strategic. We find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data. Moreover, voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible. The latter finding may serve to rationalize the co-existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.