Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Heng
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1-6
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; Common value; auctions

摘要

This note considers equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions with two bidders. We show that for each ex post equilibrium in continuous and undominated strategies, a sequence of almost common-value auctions can be constructed such that each of them possesses a unique undominated and continuous equilibrium and the corresponding sequence of equilibria converges to that ex post equilibrium. As an implication, no equilibrium selection of this model based on perturbations seems to be more convincing than others. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.