Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karos, Dominik
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 239-252
• 关键词: Apex games; core stability; hedonic games; Strong monotony

摘要

An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.