Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Paris School of Economics; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 284-290
• 关键词: Behavioral mechanism design; implementation; Lying costs; Separable domain

摘要

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.