Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hilbe, Christian; Traulsen, Arne; Sigmund, Karl
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Max Planck Society; University of Vienna; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 41-52
• 关键词: Repeated games; Zero-determinant strategies; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; extortion

摘要

Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.