Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John
• 署名单位: University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Technology Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.014
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 186-206
• 关键词: expertise; mixed strategy; Minimax; laboratory experiments

摘要

We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium play, the frequencies of experts exhibit less heterogeneity. We find evidence that the style of online play transfers from the field to the lab. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.