The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Noldeke, Georg; Pena, Jorge
• 署名单位: University of Basel; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 71-81
• 关键词: Costly voting; Participation games; mixed strategy equilibrium; Polynomials in Bernstein form

摘要

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). To do so, we use methods based on polynomials in Bernstein form to determine how the probability that a voter is pivotal depends on the participation probability and the number of players in the game. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.