Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hwang, Sung-Ha; Lim, Wooyoung; Neary, Philip; Newton, Jonathan
• 署名单位: Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Kyoto University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 273-294
• 关键词: evolution; Nash program; Logit choice; egalitarianism

摘要

When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.