Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Chia-Hui; Chen, Kong-Pin; Ishida, Junichiro
• 署名单位: Kyoto University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230326
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Reputation; management; selection; platform

摘要

Rating systems, widely used in online transactions, often reduce buyers' diverse opinions to summary statistics. To explore the consequences of this coarse aggregation, we analyze a dynamic adverse selection model where buyers share anonymous evaluations via a rating system. With heterogeneous buyers, the seller is tempted to secretly lower prices to attract favorable ratings from price-sensitive buyers. That leads to sporadic flash sales. The seller's incentive to manipulate ratings is, however, self-defeating. Our analysis illustrates how the rating system shapes the allocation of surplus and offers insights for platform and product design.