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作者：Egan, Mark; Matvos, Gregor; Seru, Amit
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Stanford University
摘要：We document the economywide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15 percent at some of the largest firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Approximately half of advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that persistently engage in mis...
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作者：Atkeson, Andrew; Burstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We examine the quantitative impact of policy-induced changes in firms' innovative investment on growth in aggregate productivity and output in a model that nests several of the canonical models. We isolate two statistics, the impact elasticity of aggregate productivity growth with respect to aggregate innovative investment and the degree of intertemporal knowledge spillovers in research, that shape the model's predicted dynamic response to a change in the innovation intensity of the economy. G...
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作者：Arellano, Cristina; Bai, Yan; Kehoe, Patrick J.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Rochester; Stanford University
摘要：The US Great Recession featured a large decline in output and labor, tighter financial conditions, and a large increase in firm growth dispersion. We build a model in which increased volatility at the firm level generates a downturn and worsened credit conditions. The key idea is that hiring inputs is risky because financial frictions limit firms' ability to insure against shocks. An increase in volatility induces firms to reduce their inputs to reduce such risk. Our model can generate most of...
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作者：Delavande, Adeline; Zafar, Basit
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We investigate the determinants of students' university choice in Pakistan, with a focus on monetary returns, nonpecuniary factors enjoyed at school, and financial constraints. To mitigate the identification problem concerning the separation of preferences, expectations, and market constraints, we use rich data on subjective expectations, with direct measures of financial constraints, to estimate a life-cycle model of school choice jointly with school-specific expectations of dropping out. We ...
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作者：Backus, Matthew; Blake, Thomas; Tadelis, Steven
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; eBay Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We outline a framework for the empirical analysis of signaling games based on three features: sorting, incentive compatibility, and beliefs. We apply it to document cheap-talk signaling in the use of round-number offers during negotiations. Using millions of online bargaining interactions, we show that items listed at multiples of $100 receive offers that are 8-12 percent lower but are 15-25 percent more likely to sell, demonstrating the trade-off requisite for incentive compatibility. Those s...
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作者：Bond, Timothy N.; Lang, Kevin
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston University
摘要：Happiness is reported in ordered intervals (e.g., very, pretty, not too happy). We review and apply standard statistical results to determine when such data permit identification of two groups' relative average happiness. The necessary conditions for nonparametric identification are strong and unlikely to ever be satisfied. Standard parametric approaches cannot identify this ranking unless the variances are exactly equal. If not, ordered probit findings can be reversed by lognormal transformat...
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作者：Meirowitz, Adam; Morelli, Massimo; Ramsay, Kristopher W.; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Princeton University; University of Warwick
摘要：Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the punishment for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of w...
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作者：Bowles, Samuel; Choi, Jung-Kyoo
作者单位：The Santa Fe Institute; Kyungpook National University (KNU)
摘要：Familiar explanations of why hunter-gatherers first took up farming-superior labor productivity, population pressure, or adverse climate-receive little support from recent evidence. Farming would be an unlikely choice without possession-based private property, which appears to have existed among rare groups of sedentary hunter-gatherers who became the first farmers. Our model shows that among them, farming could have benefited first adopters because private possession was more readily establis...
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr; Martini, Giorgio
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：We propose a price-theoretic approach to Bayesian persuasion by establishing an analogy between the sender's problem and finding Walrasian equilibria of a persuasion economy. The sender, who acts as a consumer, purchases posterior beliefs at their prices using the prior distribution as her endowment. A single firm has the technology to garble the state. Welfare theorems provide a verification tool for optimality of a persuasion scheme and characterize the structure of prices that support the o...
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作者：Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo
作者单位：Baylor University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute
摘要：We propose a new theory of systemic risk based on Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity). Because of uncertainty aversion, bad news on one asset class worsens investors' expectations on other asset classes, so that idiosyncratic risk creates contagion, snowballing into systemic risk. In a Diamond and Dybvig setting, uncertainty-averse investors are less prone to run individual banks, but runs can be systemic and are associated with stock market crashes and flight to quality. Finally, increasing unc...
