On the Empirical Content of Cheap-Talk Signaling: An Application to Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Backus, Matthew; Blake, Thomas; Tadelis, Steven
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; eBay Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/701699
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1599-1628
• 关键词: PRECISION; INFORMATION; bandwidth; returns

摘要

We outline a framework for the empirical analysis of signaling games based on three features: sorting, incentive compatibility, and beliefs. We apply it to document cheap-talk signaling in the use of round-number offers during negotiations. Using millions of online bargaining interactions, we show that items listed at multiples of $100 receive offers that are 8-12 percent lower but are 15-25 percent more likely to sell, demonstrating the trade-off requisite for incentive compatibility. Those same sellers are more likely to accept a similar offer, and buyers are more likely to investigate their listings, consistent with seller sorting and buyer belief updating.