Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meirowitz, Adam; Morelli, Massimo; Ramsay, Kristopher W.; Squintani, Francesco
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Princeton University; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/700761
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 378-418
• 关键词: Mediation; CONFLICT; COMMUNICATION; intervention; INFORMATION; deterrence

摘要

Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the punishment for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.