The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Egan, Mark; Matvos, Gregor; Seru, Amit
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/700735
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 233-295
• 关键词: Fraud; CONSEQUENCES; BROKERS

摘要

We document the economywide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15 percent at some of the largest firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Approximately half of advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that persistently engage in misconduct coexist with firms that have clean records. We show that this phenomenon may be explained by some firms specializing in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers.