On Information Design in Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mathevet, Laurent; Perego, Jacopo; Taneva, Ina
• 署名单位: New York University; Columbia University; University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/705332
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1370-1404
• 关键词: social value; equilibrium

摘要

Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents' beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents' beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.