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作者：Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：An updating rule specifies how an agent reacts to information. It is Blackwell monotone if more information is always better for an agent in any decision problem and strictly Blackwell monotone if, in addition, every strict information improvement is strictly better in some decision problem. Bayes's law is strictly Blackwell monotone. Within a broad class of updating rules-those that distort Bayesian posteriors in a signal-independent manner-it is the only strictly Blackwell-monotone updating ...
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作者：Heckman, James; Zhou, Jin
作者单位：University of Chicago; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper investigates the weekly evolution of skills as measured by unique data from a widely emulated early-childhood home-visiting program in rural China. The design of the study avoids input endogeneity issues and lack of comparable measures of skills that plague previous studies. Skills, nominally classified as the same, in fact, do not appear to share a common unit scale across levels. They are produced by skill- and life cycle-stage-specific learning processes. A novel dynamic stochast...
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作者：Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas; Lewis, Matthew S.; Marx, Leslie M.; Wu, Xiaosong
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Liverpool; Clemson University; Duke University
摘要：Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, w...
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作者：Elliott, Jonathan T.; Houngbonon, Georges V.; Ivaldi, Marc; Scott, Paul T.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructure among mobile network operators. Although consolidation increases market power, it can lead to more efficient data transmission due to economies of scale, which we derive from physical principles. After estimating our model with French consumer and infrastructure data, equilibrium simulations reveal that while prices decrease with the number of firms, so do download speeds. Our framework also allows us to quantify the impact of spec...
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作者：Bierdel, Aime; Drenik, Andres; Herreno, Juan; Ottonello, Pablo
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Minnesota System; Federal Reserve System - USA; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We study the macroeconomic implications of asymmetric information in capital markets. We build a model in which heterogeneous capital is traded in illiquid markets, with sellers better informed about its quality than buyers. Asymmetric information distorts the terms of trade for sellers of high-quality capital, who list higher prices and accept lower trading probabilities to signal their type. Guided by the model, we measure these distortions from the relationship between listed prices and tra...
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作者：Liang, Annie; Lu, Jay; Mu, Xiaosheng; Okumura, Kyohei
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：Algorithm designers increasingly care not only about accuracy but also about fairness across predefined groups. We study the trade-off between these objectives and characterize it by a fairness-accuracy frontier: the set of outcomes that cannot be simultaneously improved in both dimensions. The shape of this frontier is governed by a simple property of the inputs, which we call group skew. In particular, reducing accuracy for both groups to increase fairness is justified if and only if inputs ...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Kong, Yunmi; Silveira, Bernardo S.; Tang, Xun
作者单位：Rice University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We develop and estimate a structural model of arbitration, accounting for asymmetric risk attitudes and learning. Using data on public sector wage disputes in New Jersey, we compare the efficiency of two popular arbitration formats: final offer and conventional. We find that although conventional arbitration hinders the transmission of case-relevant information from the disputants to the arbitrator, this format outperforms final offer arbitration by affording discretion to select awards. We al...
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作者：Slattery, Cailin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：State and local governments in the United States compete to attract firms by offering discretionary subsidies. I use a private value English auction to model the subsidy bidding process and quantify the welfare effects of competition. The allocation of rents between states and firms depends on the heterogeneity in states' valuations for firms and the substitutability of locations. I find that competition increases welfare by less than 5% over a subsidy ban, and states compete away the surplus,...
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作者：Mak, Eric; Siow, Aloysius
作者单位：University of Jinan; University of Toronto
摘要：We combine classic occupational choice (Roy model) and frictionless matching (following Sattinger) to explain earnings by occupation and firm in a way that is consistent with double assignment. In our model, within-firm inequality is globally nonzero whenever there is asymmetry in the revenue function or the occupational skill distribution across occupations. Occupational earnings overlap each other, and, unlike in the Roy model, the distributions of potential earnings are endogenous. In line ...
