Blackwell-Monotone Updating Rules

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Whitmeyer, Mark
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/741272
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Dynamic consistency; MODEL; Informativeness; uncertainty; THEOREM; CHOICE

摘要

An updating rule specifies how an agent reacts to information. It is Blackwell monotone if more information is always better for an agent in any decision problem and strictly Blackwell monotone if, in addition, every strict information improvement is strictly better in some decision problem. Bayes's law is strictly Blackwell monotone. Within a broad class of updating rules-those that distort Bayesian posteriors in a signal-independent manner-it is the only strictly Blackwell-monotone updating rule. If decisions are evaluated nonpaternalistically (according to an agent's beliefs), the Blackwell-monotone updating rules are affine distortions of Bayesian posteriors.