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作者：Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent's reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopol...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Delabastita, Vincent; Rubens, Michael
作者单位：Radboud University Nijmegen; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Empirical models of labor market competition usually assume that employers set wages noncooperatively, despite frequent allegations of collusive employer behavior. We propose an identification approach for labor market collusion that relies on production and cost data, and we use it to study how employer collusion affected wage markdowns of 227 Belgian coal firms between 1845 and 1913. We are able to detect collusion through the 1897 coal cartel without ex ante knowledge of its timing and find...
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作者：Marra, Marleen
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：This paper develops and estimates a structural auction platform model with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers to study the welfare impacts of fee changes. Estimates from a new wine auction dataset illustrate the striking feature of two-sided markets that some users can be made better off despite paying higher fees. The results also underscore the importance of addressing seller selection when endogenizing (buyer) entry onto auction platforms. Quantifying the welfare effects from (anticompe...
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作者：Dominguez-Iino, Tomas
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I build an empirical model of the South American agricultural sector to show how environmental policy is transmitted along a supply chain when regulation at the externality's source is infeasible. Given obstacles to a first-best carbon tax on farmers, I show how second-best alternatives-downstream agribusiness taxes-reduce upstream emissions, but their effectiveness is limited by poor targeting while also being regressive. Agribusiness monopsony power worsens targeting by lowering pass-through...
