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作者：Chade, Hector; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A finite number of vertically differentiated firms simultaneously compete for and screen agents with private information about their payoffs. In equilibrium, higher firms serve higher types. Each firm distorts the allocation downward from the efficient level on types below a threshold, but upward above. While payoffs in this game are neither quasi-concave nor continuous, if firms are sufficiently differentiated, then any strategy profile that satisfies a simple set of necessary conditions is a...
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作者：Alesina, Alberto; Hohmann, Sebastian; Michalopoulos, Stelios; Papaioannou, Elias
作者单位：Harvard University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Brown University; University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We examine intergenerational mobility (IM) in educational attainment in Africa since independence using census data. First, we map IM across 27 countries and more than 2800 regions, documenting wide cross-country and especially within-country heterogeneity. Inertia looms large as differences in the literacy of the old generation explain about half of the observed spatial disparities in IM. The rural-urban divide is substantial. Though conspicuous in some countries, there is no evidence of syst...
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作者：Bhandari, Anmol; Evans, David; Golosov, Mikhail; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Oregon; University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets, and nominal rigidities. Our approach uses small-noise expansions and Frechet derivatives to approximate equilibria quickly and efficiently. Responses of optimal policies to aggregate shocks differ qualitatively from what they would be in a corresponding representative agent economy and are an order of magnitude larger. A motive to provide insurance that arises from heterogeneit...
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作者：Andrews, Isaiah; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Brown University
摘要：We propose a positive model of empirical science in which an analyst makes a report to an audience after observing some data. Agents in the audience may differ in their beliefs or objectives, and may therefore update or act differently following a given report. We contrast the proposed model with a classical model of statistics in which the report directly determines the payoff. We identify settings in which the predictions of the proposed model differ from those of the classical model, and se...
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作者：Guvenen, Fatih; Karahan, Fatih; Ozkan, Serdar; Song, Jae
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto
摘要：We study individual male earnings dynamics over the life cycle using panel data on millions of U.S. workers. Using nonparametric methods, we first show that the distribution of earnings changes exhibits substantial deviations from lognormality, such as negative skewness and very high kurtosis. Further, the extent of these nonnormalities varies significantly with age and earnings level, peaking around age 50 and between the 70th and 90th percentiles of the earnings distribution. Second, we esti...
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作者：Azar, Jose; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm's decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot-Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities-rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns to scale are non-increasing, then an increase in ...
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作者：Da, Rui; Xiu, Dacheng
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We conduct inference on volatility with noisy high-frequency data. We assume the observed transaction price follows a continuous-time Ito-semimartingale, contaminated by a discrete-time moving-average noise process associated with the arrival of trades. We estimate volatility, defined as the quadratic variation of the semimartingale, by maximizing the likelihood of a misspecified moving-average model, with its order selected based on an information criterion. Our inference is uniformly valid o...
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作者：Garcia-Santana, Manuel; Pijoan-Mas, Josep; Villacorta, Lucciano
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the joint evolution of the sectoral composition and the investment rate of developing economies. Using panel data for several countries in different stages of development, we document three novel facts: (a) the share of industry and the investment rate are strongly correlated and follow a hump-shaped profile with development, (b) investment goods contain more domestic value added from industry and less from services than consumption goods do, and (c) the evolution of the sectoral comp...
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作者：Greinecker, Michael; Kah, Christopher
作者单位：University of Graz; Daimler AG
摘要：We formulate a stability notion for two-sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high-dimensional and need not be compact. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers, and stable matchings correspond precisely to limits of stable matchings for finite-agent models. We can embed existing continuum ...
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作者：Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：To measure the benefits of formal contract enforcement for society, I create a market with merchants and buyers, in which buyers can choose whether to buy, and whether to pay. A set of multiple state-favored ethnic groups control the state. I experimentally vary whether formal contracts are required and the composition of buyer-merchant pairs. The design separately identifies the effect of the contracts on the buyers' incentive to pay and on their incentive to buy. I document two ways in which...
