INSTABILITY OF CENTRALIZED MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peivandi, Ahmad; Vohra, Rakesh V.
• 署名单位: Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15579
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 163-179
• 关键词: mechanisms; INFORMATION; efficient; core

摘要

Centralized markets reduce search for buyers and sellers. Their thickness increases the chance of order execution at nearly competitive prices. In spite of the incentives to consolidate, some markets, securities markets and on-line advertising being the most notable, are fragmented into multiple trading venues. We argue that fragmentation is an inevitable feature of any centralized market except in special circumstances.