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作者：Engbom, Niklas; Moser, Christian
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); New York University; Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Increases in the minimum wage can substantially reduce earnings inequality. To demonstrate this, we combine administrative and sur-vey data with an equilibrium model of the Brazilian labor market. We find that a 128 percent increase in the real minimum wage in Brazil between 1996 and 2018 had far-reaching spillover effects on wages higher up in the distribution. The increased minimum wage accounts for 45 percent of a large fall in earnings inequality over this period. At the same time, the eff...
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作者：Montero, Eduardo; Yang, Dean
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Does variation in how religious festivals are celebrated have eco-nomic consequences? We study the economic impacts of the timing of Catholic patron saint day festivals in Mexico. For causal iden-tification, we exploit cross-locality variation in festival dates and in the timing of agricultural seasons. We estimate the impact of agriculturally coinciding festivals (those coinciding with peak planting or harvest months) on long-run economic development of localities. Agriculturally coinciding ...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas; Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions ...
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作者：Butera, Luigi; Metcalfe, Robert; Morrison, William; Taubinsky, Dmitry
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects-such as costs of shame or gains from pride are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gorno, Leandro; Maestri, Lucas; Sun, Jian; Wei, Dong
作者单位：Boston College; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Singapore Management University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The principal gradually learns about the agent's private type from a noisy performance measure that can be manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fully characterize the unique Markov equilibrium of this game. We find that terminations/market crashes are often preceded by a spike in manipulation intensity and (expected) performance. Moreover, due to endogenous signal manipulation, too much transparency can i...
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作者：Dinerstein, Michael; Megalokonomou, Rigissa; Yannelis, Constantine
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Queensland; Monash University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Human capital can depreciate if skills are unused. But estimating human capital depreciation is challenging, as worker skills are difficult to measure and less productive workers are more likely to spend time in nonemployment. We overcome these challenges with new administrative data on teachers' assignments and their students' outcomes, and quasi-random variation from the teacher assignment process in Greece. We find significant losses to output, as a one-year increase in time without formal ...
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作者：Caballero, Ricardo J.; Simsek, Alp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We build a model in which the Fed and the market disagree about future aggregate demand. The market anticipates monetary policy mistakes, which affect current demand and induce the Fed to partially accommodate the market's view. The Fed expects to implement its view gradually. Announcements that reveal an unexpected change in the Fed's belief provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks. Tantrum shocks arise when the market misinterprets the Fed's belief and overreacts to its announcem...
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作者：Farboodi, Maryam; Kondor, Peter
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We investigate the heterogeneous boom and bust patterns across countries that emerge as a result of global shocks. Our analysis sheds light on the emergence of core and periphery countries, and the joint determination of the depth of recessions and tightness of credit across countries. The model implies that interest rates are similar across core and periphery countries in booms, with larger credit and output growth in periphery countries. However, a common global shock that leads to a credit ...
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作者：Balan, Pablo; Bergeron, Augustin; Tourek, Gabriel; Weigel, Jonathan L.
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Stanford University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which ...
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作者：Bobonis, Gustavo J.; Gertler, Paul J.; Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco; Nichter, Simeon
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens' participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citize...
