Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas; Monzon, Ignacio
• 署名单位: Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201718
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1591-1620
• 关键词: Monopoly

摘要

We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer's payoff shrinks to zero.