Vulnerability and Clientelismt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bobonis, Gustavo J.; Gertler, Paul J.; Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco; Nichter, Simeon
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190565
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 3627-3659
• 关键词: field experiment; voting-behavior; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; LAND; voters; HEALTH; determinants; networks; POLITICS; ECONOMY

摘要

This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens' participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. Moreover, reducing vulnerability decreases votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clien