Monetary Policy with Opinionated Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caballero, Ricardo J.; Simsek, Alp
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210271
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2353-2392
• 关键词: federal-reserve; interest-rates; yield curve; COMMUNICATION; expectations; INFORMATION

摘要

We build a model in which the Fed and the market disagree about future aggregate demand. The market anticipates monetary policy mistakes, which affect current demand and induce the Fed to partially accommodate the market's view. The Fed expects to implement its view gradually. Announcements that reveal an unexpected change in the Fed's belief provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks. Tantrum shocks arise when the market misinterprets the Fed's belief and overreacts to its announcement. Uncertainty about tantrums motivates further gradualism and communication. Finally, disagreements affect the market's expected inflation and induce a policy trade-off similar to cost-push shocks.