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作者：Monte, Ferdinando; Porcher, Charly; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Georgetown University; Georgetown University; University of Chicago
摘要：Relative to remote work, working downtown facilitates valuable interactions with other in-office workers but entails commuting costs. The resulting coordination mechanism can lead to multiple stationary equilibria with varying levels of remote work. Temporary reductions in commuters, as in the COVID-19 pandemic, can lead to persistently large fractions of remote workers. Cell phone-based mobility data for the United States shows commuting trips in the largest cities, which are more likely to e...
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作者：Aspelund, Karl M.; Russo, Anna
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Mechanisms that aim to reduce environmental degradation at low cost can be undermined when participants' conservation actions are not marginal to the incentive-or additional-as the lowest-cost participants may not be the highest social value. We investigate this challenge in the Conservation Reserve Program's auction mechanism for ecosystem services, linking bids to satellite-derived land use. Three-quarters of marginal auction winners are not additional. The heterogeneity in counterfactual la...
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作者：Kono, Haruki; Saito, Kota; Sandroni, Alec
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); California Institute of Technology
摘要：The random utility model (RUM), a cornerstone in economics, is typically studied under the assumption that choice frequencies of all alternatives are observable. In practice, however, some alternatives have unobservable choice frequencies and are commonly aggregated into a single category called an outside option. We study RUM in such environments and derive a finite, nonredundant system of inequality constraints on observed choice frequencies that characterizes RU-rationalizability. We show t...
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作者：Huitfeldt, Ingrid; Marone, Victoria; Waldinger, Daniel
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Yale University; New York University
摘要：We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism-patients waiting for each others' GPs, but who cannot trade-and estimate a structural model of GP-switching behavior to evaluate alternatives. Introducing top trading cycles (TTC) would, on average, reduce wait...
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作者：Chalfin, Aaron; Goncalves, Felipe
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer prefere...
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作者：Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Langer, Ashley; Reguant, Mar
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Arizona
摘要：Natural gas has replaced coal as the dominant fuel for US electricity generation. However, utilities in regulated US states have retired coal more slowly than others. We build a structural model of rate-of-return regulation during an energy transition where utilities face trade-offs between lowering costs and maintaining and using legacy capacity. A regulated utility facing carbon taxes lowers short-run coal generation 48 percent as much as a cost minimizer would. Thirty years after a sudden e...
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作者：Chan, David; Chen, Yiqun
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：This paper studies the productivity of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physicians, two professions performing overlapping tasks but with starkly different backgrounds, training, and pay. Using quasi-experimental variation inpatient assignment to NPs versus physicians in Veterans Health Administration emergency departments, we find that, on average, NPs use more resources and exhibit a higher 30-day preventable hospitalization rate than physicians. However, the NP-physician performance difference...
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作者：Goncalves, Felipe; Jacome, Elisa; Weisburst, Emily
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the role of victim reporting in the production of public safety. We examine the Secure Communities program, a crime-reduction policy that involved police in detecting unauthorized immigrants and increased deportation fears in immigrant communities. We find that the policy reduced the likelihood that Hispanic victims report crimes to police and increased offending against Hispanics. The number of reported crimes is unchanged, masking these opposing effects. We show that reduced reporti...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Illanes, Gaston; Stillerman, David
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; American University
摘要：We document the effects of a comprehensive set of mergers of consumer packaged goods manufacturers on prices, quantities, and product assortment. Across specifications, we find a small average price effect of mergers (-0.5-1.1 percent) but substantial heterogeneity, with a standard deviation between 3.9 and 7.6 percentage points. Through a model of enforcement, we find that agencies act as if they challenge mergers they expect would increase prices more than 4.8 to 6.3 percent. Increases in st...
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作者：Haegele, Ingrid
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, managers who are evaluated on team performance have an incentive to hoard workers. This study provides the first empirical evidence of talent hoarding using personnel records and survey evidence from a large firm. Talent hoarding is self-reported by three-fourths of managers, is detectable in manager ratings of worker talent, and occurs more frequently under stronger hoarding incentives, proxied by performance-related p...
