Additionality and Asymmetric Information in Environmental Markets: Evidence from Conservation Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aspelund, Karl M.; Russo, Anna
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20250295
• 发表日期: 2026-08
• 页码: 2765-2805
• 关键词: OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT; RESERVE PROGRAM; carbon offsets; land-use; insurance; payments; services; US; welfare; CHOICE

摘要

Mechanisms that aim to reduce environmental degradation at low cost can be undermined when participants' conservation actions are not marginal to the incentive-or additional-as the lowest-cost participants may not be the highest social value. We investigate this challenge in the Conservation Reserve Program's auction mechanism for ecosystem services, linking bids to satellite-derived land use. Three-quarters of marginal auction winners are not additional. The heterogeneity in counterfactual land use introduces adverse selection. We develop a model of bidding and additionality to quantify welfare implications. Alternative auctions increase efficiency by using scoring rules that incorporate expected land use impacts. (JEL D44, D82, Q24, Q57, R14)