Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chalfin, Aaron; Goncalves, Felipe
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20231696
• 发表日期: 2026-08
• 页码: 2962-2995
• 关键词: racial bias; incentives; crime; cops; determinants; EFFICIENCY; POLITICS; ECONOMY; GENDER; cities

摘要

We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.