-
作者：De los Santos, Babur; O'Brien, Daniel P.; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Arizona; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicat...
-
作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Oxford; Basque Foundation for Science; University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper, we propose a novel way to measure behavioral heterogeneity in a population of stochastic individuals. Our measure is choice-based; it evaluates the probability that, over a randomly selected menu, the sampled choices of two sampled individuals differ. We provide axiomatic foundations for this measure and a decomposition result that separates heterogeneity into its intrapersonal and interpersonal components. (JEL D01, D11, D91)
-
作者：Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We introduce a new type of games, called opportunity-hunting games, in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (opportunity) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free ri...
-
作者：Ebert, Sebastian; Koster, Mats
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Penny-picking refers to the often-observed phenomenon of repeatedly taking negatively skewed risks and seems directly at odds with evidence on (positive-) skewness-seeking as observed in static settings. We show that penny-picking may not only occur despite skewness-seeking, but-seemingly paradoxically-because of skewness-seeking. With sufficient time available, risks with arbitrary negative skewness can be gambled in such a way that, overall, skewness is positive. Therefore, classical behavio...
-
作者：Jungbauer, Thomas; Nicholson, Sean; Pan, June; Waldman, Michael; Wang, Lucy Xiaolu
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product's location in product space. An empirical analysis of our tes...
-
作者：Blumenthal, Benjamin
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters' ability to communicate with each other, making less-in...
-
作者：Benkard, C. Lanier; Yurukoglu, Ali; Zhang, Anthony Lee
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper measures concentration in narrowly defined product markets for a broad range of consumer goods and services in the United States from 1994 to 2019. We document two main empirical facts. First, concentration levels are high. Of the markets in our sample, 44.4 percent are highly concentrated as defined by US regulators. Second, market concentration has been decreasing since 1994. The median HHI falls from 2,362 to 2,045. These findings stand in stark contrast to the prior literature, ...
-
作者：Gaudin, Germain
作者单位：University of Freiburg
摘要：We study quality distortions when firms hold market power. We develop a model allowing for flexible functional forms of demand in order to extend Spence's (1975) monopoly analysis to imperfect competition. We show that quality distortions are determined by a competition effect that captures the externality a firm exerts on its competitors when raising both its price and its quality, in addition to Spence's (1975) effect related to the shape of total market demand. Our approach also allows us t...
-
作者：Hara, Chiaki; Mukerji, Sujoy; Riedel, Frank; Tallon, Jean-Marc
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bielefeld; University of Johannesburg; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper examines efficient allocations in economies where consumers exhibit heterogeneous smooth ambiguity preferences and face model uncertainty with a common set of identifiable models. Aggregate endowment is ambiguous. We characterize economies where the representative consumer is of the smooth ambiguity type and derive efficient sharing rules. Heterogeneous ambiguity aversion leads to sharing rules that systematically differ from those in vNM economies. The representative consumer's amb...
-
作者：Strack, Philipp; Taubinsky, Dmitry
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the possibility of identifying time-inconsistent preferences in empirical designs where preferences are elicited in advance at time 0 and then again at time 1, after the agent receives additional information. For single-peaked preferences, time consistency is rejected only when the time-1 ranking between a pair of alternatives is always the reverse of the time-0 ranking. We establish variations and generalizations of this result. Since such stark reversals are rarely observed, choice-...
