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作者：Liu, Ce; Wang, Ziwei; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Michigan State University; Peking University
摘要：Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms interact over time with short-lived workers. We show that when wages are flexible and firms are sufficiently patient, a dynamically stable solution always exists in many-to-one matching markets - even with complementarities and peer effects. Flexible...
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作者：Baumann, Leonie; Dutta, Rohan
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent's ex ante winning probability is monotone i...
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作者：Das, Kaustav; Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
作者单位：University of Leicester; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model with uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects: It may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect), increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect), and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). The model suggests mergers are more desirable when R&D outcomes are highly uncertain, but less so when the innovation...
