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作者：Fresard, Laurent
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper shows that large cash reserves lead to systematic future market share gains at the expense of industry rivals. Using shifts in import tariffs to identify exogenous intensification of competition, difference-in-difference estimations support the causal impact of cash on product market performance. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the competitive effect of cash is markedly distinct from the strategic effect of debt on product market outcomes. This effect is stronger when rivals fac...
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作者：Hertzberg, Andrew; Liberti, Jose Maria; Paravisini, Daniel
作者单位：Columbia University; DePaul University
摘要：We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves com...
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作者：Brockman, Paul; Martin, Xiumin; Unlu, Emre
作者单位：Lehigh University; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturit...
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作者：Berk, Jonathan B.; Stanton, Richard; Zechner, Josef
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade-off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consis...
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作者：Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Stapled finance is a loan commitment arranged by a seller in an M&A setting. Whoever wins the bidding contest has the option (not the obligation) to accept this loan commitment. We show that stapled finance increases bidding competition by subsidizing weak bidders, who raise their bids and thereby the price that strong bidders (who are more likely to win) must pay. The lender expects not to break even and must be compensated for offering the loan. This reduces but does not eliminate the seller...
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作者：Matsa, David A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier-organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm-level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in un...
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作者：Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni; Marquez, Robert
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Boston University
摘要：We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary-based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate-level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch-based structures are preferred to subsidiary-based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic risk, and vice versa. Great...
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作者：Greenwood, Robin; Hanson, Samuel; Stein, Jeremy C.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is high...
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作者：Rice, Tara; Strahan, Philip E.
作者单位：Boston College; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：While relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion permitted banking organizations to expand across state lines, it allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion. These differences in states' branching restrictions affect credit supply. In states more open to branching, small firms borrow at interest rates 80 to 100 basis points lower than firms operating in less open states. Firms in open states also are more likely to borrow from banks. Despite this evidence that intersta...
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作者：Duchin, Ran
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper studies the relation between corporate liquidity and diversification. The key finding is that multidivision firms hold significantly less cash than stand-alone firms because they are diversified in their investment opportunities. Lower cross-divisional correlations in investment opportunity and higher correlations between investment opportunity and cash flow correspond to lower cash holdings, even after controlling for cash flow volatility. The effects are strongest in financially c...
