Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hertzberg, Andrew; Liberti, Jose Maria; Paravisini, Daniel
• 署名单位: Columbia University; DePaul University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01553.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 795-828
• 关键词: Career concerns; corporate governance; EARNINGS FORECASTS; FUND MANAGERS; INVESTMENT; ORGANIZATIONS; authority; analysts

摘要

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self-reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.