Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsa, David A.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01565.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1197-1232
• 关键词: to-work laws; Union membership; empirical-evidence; corporate-finance; Product markets; INVESTMENT; LABOR; entry; debt; deterrence

摘要

I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier-organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm-level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.