Risk and the Corporate Structure of Banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni; Marquez, Robert
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01561.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1075-1096
• 关键词: internal capital-markets; ABROAD

摘要

We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary-based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate-level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch-based structures are preferred to subsidiary-based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic risk, and vice versa. Greater cross-country risk correlation and more accurate pricing of risk by investors reduce the differences between the two structures. Furthermore, a bank's corporate structure affects its risk taking and affiliate size.