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作者：Hochberg, Yael V.; Ljungqvist, Alexander; Lu, Yang
作者单位：Northwestern University; New York University
摘要：We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one-standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one-third. Entrants with established ties to target-market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react str...
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作者：Benmelech, Efraim; Moskowitz, Tobias J.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Financial regulation was as hotly debated a political issue in the 19th century as it is today. We study the political economy of state usury laws in 19th century America. Exploiting the wide variation in regulation, enforcement, and economic conditions across states and time, we find that usury laws when binding reduce credit and economic activity, especially for smaller firms. We examine the motives of regulation and find that usury laws coincide with other economic and political policies fa...
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作者：Iliev, Peter
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper exploits a natural quasi-experiment to isolate the effects that were uniquely due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX): U.S. firms with a public float under $75 million could delay Section 404 compliance, and foreign firms under $700 million could delay the auditor's attestation requirement. As designed, Section 404 led to conservative reported earnings, but also imposed real costs. On net, SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms.
